The path breakdown was populated only inside the IP-range branch, so it silently covered one of the two verification methods. Vendors confirmed by PTR or ASN - YouBot, Amazonbot, Meta - were counted in their own table but contributed nothing to the only output that shows what crawlers actually fetch. On the sample instance that hid roughly 40% of the verified requests from the path list. Collect paths per address during the log pass and merge them once the address is confirmed, whichever method confirms it. Private-source hits are excluded, since those addresses are never judged either way. Move the section to the end of the report and retitle it: it now spans both tables above, so placing it under the IP-range table implied a narrower scope than it has. Assisted-by: Claude:opus-5
510 lines
24 KiB
Python
Executable file
510 lines
24 KiB
Python
Executable file
#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""Crawler watch for a Traefik-fronted Forgejo (or any Traefik site).
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Separates real AI crawlers from traffic that only claims to be, by
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checking the source IP against each vendor's published range list.
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Modes:
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(default) daily threshold alert: mail only if yesterday exceeded
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CRAWLER_THRESHOLD requests
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--weekly summary: always mail stats for the past 7 days
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--dry-run print instead of mailing (combinable with --weekly)
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Configuration is by environment variable; see README.md. The only
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value with no sensible default is CRAWLER_RECIPIENT.
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"""
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import configparser, glob, gzip, ipaddress, json, os, re, smtplib, socket, subprocess, sys, urllib.request
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from collections import Counter
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from datetime import date, timedelta
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from email.mime.text import MIMEText
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# --- configuration ------------------------------------------------------
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THRESHOLD = int(os.environ.get("CRAWLER_THRESHOLD", "100000"))
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RECIPIENT = os.environ.get("CRAWLER_RECIPIENT", "")
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SITE = os.environ.get("CRAWLER_SITE", "this site")
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LOG_GLOB = os.environ.get("CRAWLER_LOG", "/var/log/traefik/access.log*")
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# Traefik router name to filter on, e.g. "forgejo@docker". Empty = all
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# traffic reaching Traefik, which is what you want for a single-site host.
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ROUTER = os.environ.get("CRAWLER_ROUTER", "")
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# Container to read SMTP settings from (Forgejo/Gitea app.ini [mailer]).
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# Set CRAWLER_SMTP_* instead to configure SMTP directly.
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MAIL_CONTAINER = os.environ.get("CRAWLER_MAIL_CONTAINER", "forgejo")
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MAIL_INI = os.environ.get("CRAWLER_MAIL_INI", "/data/gitea/conf/app.ini")
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WEEKLY = "--weekly" in sys.argv
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DRY = "--dry-run" in sys.argv
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if not RECIPIENT and not DRY:
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sys.exit("CRAWLER_RECIPIENT is not set (no --dry-run either); refusing "
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"to run. See README.md.")
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# --- verified-crawler support -------------------------------------------
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# Vendors publishing machine-readable IP ranges. A UA token alone proves
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# nothing: on the instance this was written for, ~83% of AI-bot-labelled
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# traffic came from hosts outside these ranges. Only IP-verified hits count.
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RANGE_SOURCES = {
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"openai": ["https://openai.com/chatgpt-user.json",
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"https://openai.com/gptbot.json",
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"https://openai.com/searchbot.json"],
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"anthropic": ["https://claude.com/crawling/bots.json"],
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"perplexity":["https://www.perplexity.ai/perplexitybot.json"],
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"apple": ["https://search.developer.apple.com/applebot.json"],
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"google": ["https://developers.google.com/static/crawling/ipranges/special-crawlers.json",
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"https://developers.google.com/static/crawling/ipranges/common-crawlers.json",
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"https://developers.google.com/static/crawling/ipranges/user-triggered-fetchers.json",
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"https://developers.google.com/static/crawling/ipranges/user-triggered-fetchers-google.json"],
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}
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# UA token -> vendor whose ranges must contain the source IP
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BOT_VENDOR = {
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"ChatGPT-User": "openai", "GPTBot": "openai", "OAI-SearchBot": "openai",
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"ClaudeBot": "anthropic", "Claude-User": "anthropic", "Claude-SearchBot": "anthropic",
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"PerplexityBot": "perplexity", "Perplexity-User": "perplexity",
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"Applebot-Extended": "apple", "Applebot": "apple",
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"Googlebot": "google", "Google-Extended": "google", "GoogleOther": "google",
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}
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# --- reverse-DNS verification -------------------------------------------
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# For vendors that publish no IP ranges. The check is forward-confirmed
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# (FCrDNS): PTR of the address must end in one of the vendor's domains,
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# AND that hostname must resolve back to the same address. The forward
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# step is what makes it meaningful - a PTR record alone is set by
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# whoever controls the address block, so it proves nothing on its own.
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BOT_RDNS = {
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"Amazonbot": (".crawl.amazonbot.amazon",),
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"meta-externalagent": (".facebook.com", ".fbsv.net"),
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"meta-externalfetcher": (".facebook.com", ".fbsv.net"),
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"FacebookBot": (".facebook.com", ".fbsv.net"),
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"YouBot": (".search.you.com",),
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"Bytespider": (".bytedance.com", ".byteoversea.com"),
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"PetalBot": (".petalsearch.com", ".aspiegel.com"),
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"DuckAssistBot": (".duckduckgo.com",),
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# Apple and Google publish ranges, but also answer rDNS; listed so a
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# range miss can still be resolved when the published file is stale.
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"Applebot": (".applebot.apple.com",),
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"Googlebot": (".googlebot.com", ".google.com"),
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}
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# rDNS is slow (two lookups per address), so only unique IPs are probed
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# and results are memoised for the run.
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RDNS_MAX = int(os.environ.get("CRAWLER_RDNS_MAX", "400"))
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RDNS_ENABLE = os.environ.get("CRAWLER_RDNS", "1") != "0"
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# --- ASN verification, for single-tenant networks only -------------------
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# An ASN match usually proves nothing: genuine YouBot and genuine
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# Amazonbot both live in AS14618, which is also every EC2 instance a
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# spoofer could rent. It is only evidence when the ASN belongs to the
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# vendor exclusively and sells no compute in it. Meta qualifies -
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# AS32934 is Meta's own network and cannot be rented - and Meta
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# publishes no IP range file (their docs say to email webmasters@meta.com),
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# so without this there is nothing to check them against at all.
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BOT_ASN = {
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"meta-externalagent": {"32934"},
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"meta-externalfetcher": {"32934"},
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"FacebookBot": {"32934"},
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"facebookexternalhit": {"32934"},
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}
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ASN_ENABLE = os.environ.get("CRAWLER_ASN", "1") != "0"
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# Team Cymru's DNS interface: <reversed-addr>.origin[6].asn.cymru.com TXT
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CYMRU4 = "origin.asn.cymru.com"
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CYMRU6 = "origin6.asn.cymru.com"
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CACHE = os.environ.get("CRAWLER_CACHE", "/var/cache/crawler-alert/ranges.json")
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CF_URL = "https://www.cloudflare.com/ips-v4"
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# claude.com and cloudflare.com sit behind Cloudflare, which 403s the
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# default Python-urllib UA. Send a real one.
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UA = "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; crawler-alert/1.0; +https://codeberg.org/)"
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def fetch(url, timeout=20):
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req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": UA})
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with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as r:
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return r.read()
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def load_ranges():
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"""Fetch vendor prefixes; fall back to cache so a vendor outage
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degrades the report instead of breaking the mail."""
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out, stale = {}, []
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for vendor, urls in RANGE_SOURCES.items():
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nets = []
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for u in urls:
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try:
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for p in json.loads(fetch(u)).get("prefixes", []):
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for k, v in p.items():
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if k.startswith("ipv"):
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nets.append(v)
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except Exception:
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stale.append(vendor)
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if nets:
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out[vendor] = nets
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cf = []
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try:
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cf = [l.strip() for l in fetch(CF_URL).decode().splitlines() if l.strip()]
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except Exception:
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stale.append("cloudflare")
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try:
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cached = json.load(open(CACHE))
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except Exception:
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cached = {}
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for vendor in RANGE_SOURCES:
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if vendor not in out and vendor in cached.get("vendors", {}):
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out[vendor] = cached["vendors"][vendor]
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if not cf:
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cf = cached.get("cloudflare", [])
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if out:
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try:
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os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(CACHE), exist_ok=True)
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json.dump({"vendors": out, "cloudflare": cf}, open(CACHE, "w"))
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except Exception:
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pass
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# bucket by first octet so lookups stay cheap over ~1425 prefixes
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idx = {}
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for vendor, nets in out.items():
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b = {}
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for s in nets:
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n = ipaddress.ip_network(s)
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b.setdefault(int(n.network_address) >> 24 if n.version == 4 else -1, []).append(n)
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idx[vendor] = b
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cfnets = [ipaddress.ip_network(s) for s in cf]
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return idx, cfnets, sorted(set(stale))
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def in_index(idx_v, addr):
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if idx_v is None:
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return False
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key = int(addr) >> 24 if addr.version == 4 else -1
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return any(addr in n for n in idx_v.get(key, []))
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_asn_cache = {}
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def asn_of(ip):
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"""Origin ASN for an address via Team Cymru's DNS interface.
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Returns the ASN as a string, or "" if it cannot be determined.
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Needs `dig`; absence degrades to no ASN evidence, never an error.
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"""
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if ip in _asn_cache:
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return _asn_cache[ip]
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asn = ""
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try:
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a = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
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if a.version == 4:
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q = ".".join(reversed(ip.split("."))) + "." + CYMRU4
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else:
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nibbles = a.exploded.replace(":", "")
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q = ".".join(reversed(nibbles)) + "." + CYMRU6
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out = subprocess.run(["dig", "+short", "+time=3", "+tries=1", q, "TXT"],
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capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=12).stdout
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# "32934 | 2a03:2880:f814::/48 | IE | ripencc | 2011-08-22"
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first = out.strip().strip('"').split("|")[0].strip()
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if first.split(" ")[0].isdigit():
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asn = first.split(" ")[0]
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except (OSError, ValueError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
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pass
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_asn_cache[ip] = asn
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return asn
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_rdns_cache = {}
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def fcrdns(ip, suffixes):
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"""Forward-confirmed reverse DNS.
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PTR must end in one of `suffixes`, and the name it gives must resolve
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back to `ip`. Returns (ok, hostname). Without the forward step this
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would only prove the address owner can write their own PTR record.
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"""
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key = (ip, suffixes)
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if key in _rdns_cache:
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return _rdns_cache[key]
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result = (False, "", "mismatch")
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try:
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host = socket.gethostbyaddr(ip)[0].rstrip(".").lower()
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if any(host.endswith(s) or host == s.lstrip(".") for s in suffixes):
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_, _, addrs = socket.gethostbyname_ex(host)
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try:
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v6 = socket.getaddrinfo(host, None, socket.AF_INET6)
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addrs = addrs + [a[4][0] for a in v6]
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except OSError:
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pass
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if ip in addrs:
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result = (True, host, "ok")
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else:
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result = (False, host, "mismatch")
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else:
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result = (False, host, "mismatch")
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except OSError:
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# No PTR at all. This is absence of evidence, not evidence of
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# forgery: Meta's IPv6 crawler space, for one, publishes no PTR
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# records. Kept distinct so a real mismatch stays visible.
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result = (False, "", "no-ptr")
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_rdns_cache[key] = result
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return result
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days = [date.today() - timedelta(days=i) for i in range(7 if WEEKLY else 1, 0, -1)]
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stamps = [d.strftime("%d/%b/%Y") for d in days]
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RANGES, CFNETS, STALE = (load_ranges() if WEEKLY else ({}, [], []))
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per_day = {s: [0, set()] for s in stamps}
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repos = Counter()
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uas = Counter()
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verified = Counter() # bot -> IP-verified hits
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spoofed = Counter() # bot -> UA claimed, IP outside vendor ranges
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proxied = Counter() # bot -> arrived via Cloudflare, unverifiable
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ver_paths = Counter() # paths fetched by verified bots
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ver_ips = {} # bot -> set of verified source IPs
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# rDNS-verified vendors: {bot: {ip: hits}}, resolved after the log pass
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rdns_hits = {b: Counter() for b in BOT_RDNS}
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rdns_proxied = Counter()
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# {bot: {ip: Counter(path)}} - kept so that once an address is confirmed
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# by DNS/ASN its paths can join the verified-path breakdown, which
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# otherwise only ever showed IP-range-verified vendors.
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rdns_paths = {b: {} for b in BOT_RDNS}
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for path in sorted(glob.glob(LOG_GLOB)):
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opener = gzip.open if path.endswith(".gz") else open
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with opener(path, "rt", errors="replace") as f:
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for line in f:
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if ROUTER and ROUTER not in line:
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continue
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for s in stamps:
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if s in line:
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per_day[s][0] += 1
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per_day[s][1].add(line.split(" ", 1)[0])
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parts = line.split()
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if len(parts) > 6 and parts[6].count("/") >= 2:
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repos["/".join(parts[6].split("/")[1:3])] += 1
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# Traefik CLF: ... "<referer>" "<user-agent>" <n> "<router>" ...
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# Anchor on the request counter so this works whatever
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# the router is called.
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ua = re.search(r"\"[^\"]*\" \"([^\"]*)\" \d+ \"", line)
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if ua:
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u = ua.group(1)
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m = re.search(r"(bot|crawler|spider|scrapy|externalagent|gpt|claude|perplexity)[\w./-]*", u, re.I)
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uas[m.group(0) if m else ("(none)" if u == "-" else "(browser-like)")] += 1
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if WEEKLY:
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# longest token first so Applebot-Extended wins over Applebot
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bot = next((b for b in sorted(BOT_VENDOR, key=len, reverse=True) if b in u), None)
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if bot:
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try:
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addr = ipaddress.ip_address(parts[0])
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except ValueError:
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addr = None
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if addr is None:
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pass
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elif any(addr in n for n in CFNETS):
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proxied[bot] += 1
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elif in_index(RANGES.get(BOT_VENDOR[bot]), addr):
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verified[bot] += 1
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ver_ips.setdefault(bot, set()).add(parts[0])
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if len(parts) > 6:
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ver_paths[parts[6][:60]] += 1
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else:
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spoofed[bot] += 1
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if WEEKLY and RDNS_ENABLE:
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rb = next((b for b in sorted(BOT_RDNS, key=len, reverse=True)
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if b in u), None)
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# skip if already counted by IP-range check
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if rb and not (rb in BOT_VENDOR and rb == bot):
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try:
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a2 = ipaddress.ip_address(parts[0])
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except ValueError:
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a2 = None
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if a2 is None:
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pass
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elif any(a2 in n for n in CFNETS):
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rdns_proxied[rb] += 1
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else:
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rdns_hits[rb][parts[0]] += 1
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if len(parts) > 6 and not a2.is_private:
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rdns_paths[rb].setdefault(
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parts[0], Counter())[parts[6][:60]] += 1
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break
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total = sum(v[0] for v in per_day.values())
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all_ips = set().union(*(v[1] for v in per_day.values()))
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# --- resolve rDNS candidates ---------------------------------------------
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# One pass over unique addresses, busiest first, capped by RDNS_MAX so a
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# flood of distinct forgeries cannot stall the report on DNS timeouts.
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rdns_ok = Counter() # bot -> forward-confirmed by PTR
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rdns_mismatch = Counter() # bot -> PTR exists but points elsewhere: forgery
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rdns_noptr = Counter() # bot -> no PTR at all: cannot be judged by DNS
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rdns_asn = Counter() # bot -> no PTR, but origin ASN is the vendor's
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rdns_skipped = Counter() # bot -> hits left unresolved by the cap
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rdns_private = Counter() # bot -> hits from RFC1918/loopback (see below)
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rdns_ok_ips = {}
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if WEEKLY and RDNS_ENABLE:
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socket.setdefaulttimeout(3)
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for bot, counter in rdns_hits.items():
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budget = RDNS_MAX
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for ip, hits in counter.most_common():
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# A private source address means the real client IP never
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# reached the log: something in front (Docker's bridge
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# gateway, a local proxy) is rewriting it. Neither verified
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# nor spoofed - the evidence simply is not there.
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if ipaddress.ip_address(ip).is_private:
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rdns_private[bot] += hits
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continue
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if budget <= 0:
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rdns_skipped[bot] += hits
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continue
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budget -= 1
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ok, _host, why = fcrdns(ip, BOT_RDNS[bot])
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confirmed = False
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if ok:
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rdns_ok[bot] += hits
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rdns_ok_ips.setdefault(bot, set()).add(ip)
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confirmed = True
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elif why == "no-ptr":
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# Fall back to ASN, but only for vendors whose network is
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# single-tenant (see BOT_ASN). Otherwise leave it unknown.
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if ASN_ENABLE and bot in BOT_ASN and asn_of(ip) in BOT_ASN[bot]:
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rdns_asn[bot] += hits
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rdns_ok_ips.setdefault(bot, set()).add(ip)
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confirmed = True
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else:
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rdns_noptr[bot] += hits
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else:
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rdns_mismatch[bot] += hits
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if confirmed:
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ver_paths.update(rdns_paths.get(bot, {}).get(ip, ()))
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socket.setdefaulttimeout(None)
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if not WEEKLY:
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s0 = stamps[0]
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count, ips = per_day[s0][0], len(per_day[s0][1])
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print(f"{s0}: {count} requests, {ips} unique IPs (threshold {THRESHOLD})")
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if DRY or count <= THRESHOLD:
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sys.exit(0)
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subject = f"{SITE}: {count} requests on {s0} (over {THRESHOLD}/day threshold)"
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body = (f"Forgejo served {count} requests from {ips} unique IPs on {s0} - "
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f"above the {THRESHOLD}/day watch threshold.\n\n"
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"Time to consider Anubis (PoW challenge) in front of Forgejo.\n")
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else:
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lines = [f"{SITE} weekly crawler report ({stamps[0]} - {stamps[-1]})", ""]
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lines.append(f"Total: {total} requests, {len(all_ips)} unique IPs")
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lines.append(f"Daily threshold alert fires above {THRESHOLD} req/day (none = quiet week)")
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lines.append("")
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lines.append("Per day:")
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for s in stamps:
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lines.append(f" {s}: {per_day[s][0]:>7} requests, {len(per_day[s][1]):>6} unique IPs")
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lines.append("")
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lines.append("Top repos:")
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for r, c in repos.most_common(5):
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lines.append(f" {c:>7} {r}")
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lines.append("")
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lines.append("User-agent classes (browser-like = mostly the spoofing swarm):")
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|
for u, c in uas.most_common(8):
|
|
lines.append(f" {c:>7} {u}")
|
|
lines.append("")
|
|
|
|
# --- legitimate (IP-verified) crawlers -------------------------------
|
|
lines.append("=" * 62)
|
|
lines.append("LEGITIMATE CRAWLERS (source IP inside vendor's published ranges)")
|
|
lines.append("=" * 62)
|
|
if STALE:
|
|
lines.append(f"NOTE: range fetch failed for {', '.join(STALE)} - used cache")
|
|
tv, ts, tp = sum(verified.values()), sum(spoofed.values()), sum(proxied.values())
|
|
claimed = tv + ts + tp
|
|
if not claimed:
|
|
lines.append(" No AI-bot user-agents seen this week.")
|
|
else:
|
|
lines.append(f" {'bot':<20}{'verified':>9}{'spoofed':>9}{'via CF':>8} {'IPs':>4}")
|
|
for bot in sorted(set(verified) | set(spoofed) | set(proxied),
|
|
key=lambda b: -(verified[b] + spoofed[b] + proxied[b])):
|
|
lines.append(f" {bot:<20}{verified[bot]:>9}{spoofed[bot]:>9}"
|
|
f"{proxied[bot]:>8} {len(ver_ips.get(bot, ())):>4}")
|
|
pct = tv / claimed * 100
|
|
lines.append("")
|
|
lines.append(f" {claimed} requests claimed an AI-bot identity; {tv} verified ({pct:.1f}%).")
|
|
lines.append(f" {ts} failed IP verification (spoofed). {tp} arrived via Cloudflare")
|
|
lines.append(" and cannot be verified by IP - not counted either way.")
|
|
# --- vendors verified by reverse DNS ---------------------------------
|
|
if RDNS_ENABLE and (rdns_ok or rdns_mismatch or rdns_noptr or rdns_asn
|
|
or rdns_proxied or rdns_private):
|
|
lines.append("")
|
|
lines.append("-" * 62)
|
|
lines.append("VERIFIED BY DNS / ASN (vendors publishing no IP ranges)")
|
|
lines.append("-" * 62)
|
|
lines.append(f" {'bot':<20}{'PTR ok':>7}{'ASN ok':>7}{'FORGED':>8}"
|
|
f"{'no-PTR':>7}{'CF':>6}{'priv':>7} {'IPs':>4}")
|
|
allbots = (set(rdns_ok) | set(rdns_mismatch) | set(rdns_noptr)
|
|
| set(rdns_asn) | set(rdns_proxied) | set(rdns_private))
|
|
for bot in sorted(allbots, key=lambda b: -(rdns_ok[b] + rdns_mismatch[b]
|
|
+ rdns_noptr[b] + rdns_asn[b]
|
|
+ rdns_proxied[b] + rdns_private[b])):
|
|
lines.append(f" {bot:<20}{rdns_ok[bot]:>7}{rdns_asn[bot]:>7}"
|
|
f"{rdns_mismatch[bot]:>8}{rdns_noptr[bot]:>7}"
|
|
f"{rdns_proxied[bot]:>6}{rdns_private[bot]:>7}"
|
|
f" {len(rdns_ok_ips.get(bot, ())):>4}")
|
|
if rdns_skipped:
|
|
sk = ", ".join(f"{b} {c}" for b, c in rdns_skipped.most_common(4))
|
|
lines.append(f" (unresolved, over CRAWLER_RDNS_MAX={RDNS_MAX}: {sk})")
|
|
lines.append("")
|
|
lines.append(" PTR ok forward-confirmed: PTR ends in a vendor domain AND")
|
|
lines.append(" that hostname resolves back to the same address.")
|
|
lines.append(" ASN ok no PTR, but the address sits in an ASN belonging")
|
|
lines.append(" solely to the vendor (Meta's AS32934). Only used")
|
|
lines.append(" where the ASN sells no compute - never for clouds.")
|
|
lines.append(" FORGED a PTR exists and points somewhere else. This is")
|
|
lines.append(" the only column that is evidence of forgery.")
|
|
lines.append(" no-PTR no PTR record and no usable ASN: unknown, not bad.")
|
|
if sum(rdns_private.values()):
|
|
lines.append(" priv logged source was RFC1918: a proxy or Docker")
|
|
lines.append(" bridge masked the client. Unjudgeable. See README.")
|
|
|
|
# --- what the verified crawlers actually fetched ---------------------
|
|
# Last, because it spans both tables above: an address only counts here
|
|
# once it has been confirmed, whether by IP range, PTR or ASN.
|
|
if ver_paths:
|
|
lines.append("")
|
|
lines.append("=" * 62)
|
|
lines.append("TOP PATHS FETCHED BY VERIFIED CRAWLERS (all methods)")
|
|
lines.append("=" * 62)
|
|
for p, c in ver_paths.most_common(12):
|
|
lines.append(f" {c:>6} {p}")
|
|
body = "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
|
|
subject = f"{SITE} weekly crawler report: {total} requests, {len(all_ips)} IPs"
|
|
if DRY:
|
|
print(subject); print(); print(body)
|
|
sys.exit(0)
|
|
|
|
# SMTP settings: use CRAWLER_SMTP_* if given, otherwise borrow them from
|
|
# a Forgejo/Gitea app.ini [mailer] section so there is no second copy of
|
|
# the credentials to keep in sync.
|
|
if os.environ.get("CRAWLER_SMTP_ADDR"):
|
|
addr = os.environ["CRAWLER_SMTP_ADDR"]
|
|
port = int(os.environ.get("CRAWLER_SMTP_PORT", "587"))
|
|
user = os.environ.get("CRAWLER_SMTP_USER", "")
|
|
passwd = os.environ.get("CRAWLER_SMTP_PASSWORD", "")
|
|
sender = os.environ.get("CRAWLER_SMTP_FROM", user or RECIPIENT)
|
|
proto = os.environ.get("CRAWLER_SMTP_PROTOCOL", "smtp+starttls")
|
|
else:
|
|
ini = subprocess.run(["docker", "exec", MAIL_CONTAINER, "cat", MAIL_INI],
|
|
capture_output=True, text=True).stdout
|
|
if not ini.strip():
|
|
sys.exit(f"could not read {MAIL_INI} from container "
|
|
f"'{MAIL_CONTAINER}' and CRAWLER_SMTP_ADDR is unset")
|
|
cp = configparser.ConfigParser(interpolation=None, strict=False)
|
|
cp.read_string("[DEFAULT]\n" + ini)
|
|
m = cp["mailer"]
|
|
proto = m.get("PROTOCOL", "smtps").strip()
|
|
addr, port = m.get("SMTP_ADDR").strip(), int(m.get("SMTP_PORT", "465").strip())
|
|
user, passwd = m.get("USER", "").strip(), m.get("PASSWD", "").strip().strip("`\"")
|
|
sender = m.get("FROM", user).strip()
|
|
|
|
msg = MIMEText(body)
|
|
msg["Subject"], msg["From"], msg["To"] = subject, sender, RECIPIENT
|
|
if proto == "smtps":
|
|
s = smtplib.SMTP_SSL(addr, port, timeout=30)
|
|
else:
|
|
s = smtplib.SMTP(addr, port, timeout=30)
|
|
if proto != "smtp": # plain smtp = no TLS (local relay)
|
|
s.starttls()
|
|
if user: # unauthenticated local relays exist
|
|
s.login(user, passwd)
|
|
s.sendmail(sender, [RECIPIENT], msg.as_string())
|
|
s.quit()
|
|
print(f"mailed to {RECIPIENT}")
|