Garage serves all three buckets and both apps, and a last comparison
found nothing in MinIO that Garage lacks. Drop the MinIO service, its
bootstrap and its root credentials from the deploy, and let compose
remove the leftover containers.
The storage_minio_data volume is left on the host. All images can be
pulled again, so the deploy goes back to failing on a pull error.
Document Garage in the README and SECRETS, including the key format and
how the existing secrets map to it, and swap the MinIO client in the
flake for awscli and rclone.
Assisted-by: Claude:fable-5-2
The data is copied and verified and both apps sign with their Garage
keys, so send s3.asxp.io to Garage's S3 API. MinIO loses its route and
stays up, unrouted, as the way back.
Garage answers no anonymous S3 request. Unsigned GET and HEAD of
/public/<key> go to its web endpoint instead, with the Host header the
endpoint picks the bucket by, so the links handed out so far keep
working. Signed requests for that bucket still reach the S3 API.
Assisted-by: Claude:fable-5-2
MinIO is abandoned upstream and its images are gone from the registries,
so the object store cannot be rebuilt or updated. Garage takes its
place.
This is the first step: Garage runs as one node next to MinIO, with the
same three buckets and one key per app, and is not routed yet. MinIO
keeps serving s3.asxp.io and is no longer bootstrapped, so its users
stay as they are until the data is copied and the apps are switched.
Garage only accepts keys in its own format. The bootstrap hashes the
existing secrets into that format, as the apps' deploys will, so no
secret has to change for the move; a secret already in Garage's format
is used as it is.
Garage has no anonymous S3 access. The public bucket is marked as a
website instead, to be served through Garage's web endpoint.
Assisted-by: Claude:fable-5-2
There was no way to share a file by link: both buckets are private and
the bootstrap forces anonymous access off on every run.
Add a bucket named public whose objects anyone can GET by key, with no
anonymous listing or writes, and an optional user that may only put and
delete there, so a leaked uploader key reads nothing and reaches no
other bucket.
Assisted-by: Claude:fable-5-2
The public bingo site is moving out of the asxpio container and only
needs to read the bingo tables and the bingo/ photos. Give it a role
limited to SELECT on those two tables (with read-only transactions by
default) and a MinIO user limited to GetObject under
asxpio-invoices/bingo/, instead of reusing asxpio's read-write
credentials.
Both steps are skipped while the BINGO_* secrets are unset, so this
deploys safely before they exist. Tables missing on a fresh install
are granted on the next deploy.
Assisted-by: Claude:opus-5
